In Passions of the
Gale, Nicole Eustace takes a new approach to studying the events leading up
to the American Revolution and the state of mankind. Focusing on
emotions/passions as the lens of study seems, initially, paradoxical. How can
one begin an intellectual voyage into the fray of passion? Couldn’t reason and
emotion be seen as mutually exclusive notions? After reading Eustace, I am
convinced this is not the case. Beginning with the first chapter on Alexander
Pope, Eustace beautifully sets the stage for a discourse on 18th
century emotions. Even the title of her book is taken from a quote by Pope, “On
life’s vast ocean diversely we sail, Reason the card, but passion the gale.”
(56) Being a bit skeptical of a discourse on something like emotions/passion
(how exactly do you quantify such notions for study, especially when so broad
and all encompassing), Eustace focuses on more intricate aspects of emotions
such as the power relations tied with emotional expression, 18th
century concepts of virtue and how they are tied to benevolence/stoicism, and
finally she details how these all changed in 18th century Pennsylvania
leading up to the American Revolution. She ties such changes to the rising egalitarianism
and the individual. As Pope mentions, passion is a virtue in itself for it is
an avenue for social good. These concepts, like that of reason/passion, are not
mutually exclusive. Such distinctions were revolutionary and highly contentious
in implications, especially in relation to social order and harmony. Something
such as passion was seen as a direct obstacle to God and the social good,
especially in Quaker Pennsylvania.
In the introduction, Eustace begins with invoking the works
of Thomas Paine to exemplify this turn and utility of emotions. Emotions are
the biggest agents of change in Eustace’s work. In the postlude she continues
that notion by dissecting Common Sense and its context. She says that
historians all too often discredit the vernacular and style of Paine’s work. “When Paine claimed that ‘the passions and
feelings of mankind’ were granted by nature equally to all and were intended to
provide a moral touchstone accessible to all, he argued implicitly for the natural
right to political participation.” In an essence “In Paine’s work, the medium
was the message” (440) Emotional individualism and self-love, such passions are
directly linked to egalitarianism and the fundamental beliefs which allowed for
the American Revolution to transpire.
One thing that I find, perhaps, troubling about this work can be found from the very beginning. Eustace states “History can intervene in running debates between contemporary scholars of ‘universalist’ and ‘constructionist’ orientations, who have staked out sharply opposing views on the constancy of human emotional capacities across time and space…a historical approach can eschew such extremes” (11) I am not convinced that she is trying to placate the extremes in her work. Rather, from what I read, she seems to almost wholly accept the universality of emotion and only apply critical analysis to this when it comes to the effects and contexts of its universality. She follows the mentality of William Reddy in that emotion is universal, yet the approach/descriptors vary across time and culture. She claims that the only reason we can study emotional history is that we, ourselves, experience such emotions. (12) I fear that such an understanding, which is still highly plausible, may be poorly founded.
After delving into Gender History for my final paper and
Poststructuralism, I must begin to wonder if the emotional dialogue as a means
of studying 18th century emotions becomes flawed when we utilize
ourselves as a sort of comparative primary source. Perhaps an anthropologist or
psychologist may be better adept to answering such a question. If, as Eustace
states, Emotion = Power/Power Relations and is understood by a study of linguistic
emotional expression, then language = emotion and thus emotion is nothing more
than a concept and idea derived from language. I believe that
poststructuralists would surely take such a position in countering Eustace. Perhaps
our context and understanding of what love, or hate, or anger, or joy is vastly
different from what 18th century Pennsylvania’s interpreted as such
concepts. I imagine that Eustace would most likely agree with this notion,
however at what point can we assuredly attest to the universality of emotion?
Even deducting the extremes, such as sociopathy, from the equation, how can we
be so sure that our language and our culture don’t have a direct
constructionist function to emotions? Where is the line drawn? Is there a line?
Typically I wouldn’t have brought such a case to light, yet Eustace maintains
such universality throughout her work. Even in the discussion of Thomas Paine
she infers that Paine’s medium of notions should be interpreted as something
like “we all feel and thus can participate, we are all equal”. The
philosophical implications vary, but the general message is the same. So I ask,
do we all actually feel the same? If not, do Eustace’s arguments still hold
water?
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